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Article 86 EC
ARTICLE 86 EC, THE EC’S ECONOMIC APPROACH TO
COMPETITION LAW, AND THE GENERAL INTEREST
GARETH DAVIES*
A. INTRODUCTION
Article 86 EC is intended to regulate the relationship between services of general
economic interest (SGEIs) and the economic rules found in the EC Treaty,
notably those on competition, state aid and free movement.1 On the one hand it
provides that states must not regulate SGEIs in a way conflicting with these
Treaty rules, in Article 86(1), but on the other it provides also that the rules will
not apply to undertakings providing SGEIs if this would obstruct their public
service mission, in Article 86(2). The article therefore emphasises that economic
law does in principle apply to SGEIs, but also provides that this application may
be limited where necessary. It embodies a compromise between the benefits of
the free market and social interests, such as the need for universal access to
important services and the stable, high quality provision of these, which may be
better served by regulated, even restricted markets.
The primary assumption upon which Article 86 rests is that without such a
dedicated Treaty rule economic law would harm these social interests.2 The strict
requirements of competition law, and to a lesser extent free movement, would
prevent states from enacting important and justified but market-restricting
measures, such as the granting of partial monopolies or exclusive rights in
certain areas. It would become impossible to exercise the necessary control over
providers and services in fields such as education, healthcare, transport and the
utilities, which require close control in the name of universal access, equality of
access, quality of provision and safety. A secondary assumption is that Article
86(1) actually extends the scope of competition law to state measures that would
otherwise fall outside it.
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(2008) 33 European Law Review 167; J Baquero Cruz, “Beyond Competition: Services of General
Interest and European Community Law” in G de Burca, EU Law and the Welfare State (Oxford
University Press, 2005), 169.
* Professor of European Law, VU University Amsterdam (Free University, Amsterdam).
It is the purpose of this paper to question these assumptions. It aims to show
that economic law either takes account of or is capable of taking account of
general interest considerations, and that measures necessary to serve legitimate
social goals will not conflict with this law in the first place. Moreover, Article
86(1) does not in fact extend the scope of application of competition law. Thus
neither Article 86(1) nor Article 86(2) adds content to the Treaty.
This is not just an academic point. The apparently important presence of
Article 86 leads national authorities to overestimate the protection it offers while
also overestimating the destructive force of competition law. Both errors exert a
distorting force on national policy, with the first also leading to a risk of future
conflict with the Treaty and resulting national policy chaos. If the state is to
respond rationally and legally to Treaty rules it needs an understanding of the
declaratory and insubstantial nature of Article 86.
However, a broader and more important point concerns the relationship
between Article 86 and competition law. Article 86 is believed to be primarily
important because it allows restrictions of competition which would otherwise be
prohibited. Articles 81 and 82 are perceived to be strict and unforgiving, with
little room for considerations of general interest or public policy. It is suggested
here that this understanding of competition law is at odds with its new
“economic” orientation. An economics-based competition law does not, indeed
cannot, prohibit public or private measures which are necessary in the general
good.3 Reliance on Article 86 is therefore inconsistent with the increasingly
economic approach to competition, and even threatens to undermine it. The
more that general interest considerations are shunted off to Article 86(2), the less
they will be internalised in the competition rules themselves, and the less these
rules will come to be economically realistic and responsible. That will lead to
bad, inefficient and incoherent policy.
This is therefore an argument about the nature of competition law, and its
relationship to competition economics. The suggestion is that Article 86
embodies a fundamental misunderstanding; the erroneous view that the general
good is in some sense “non-economic” and cannot be included within Articles 81
and 82. That view, it is suggested, has implications beyond the specific SGEI
context, and represents a threat to European welfare in both the popular and the
economic senses of the word.
The article looks first at Article 86(1), then Article 86(2), and finally at what
competition economics has to say about the role of the general interest in
competition law.
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3 PJ Hammer, “Antitrust beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, and the Challenge
of Intramarket Second-best Tradeoffs” (2000) 98 Michigan Law Review 849; see also W Kerber and
A Christiansen, “Competition Policy with Optimally Differentiated Rules instead of “Per Se”
Rules vs Rule of Reason” (2006) 2 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 215.
B. WHAT DOES ARTICLE 86(1) DO?
If read literally, Article 86(1) is no more than declarative.4 It states that Member
States may not, with respect to undertakings to which they grant special rights,
“enact or maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules in this Treaty”. In
this phrase Article 86(1) seems quite explicitly to make a violation of itself
dependent upon a prior violation of another article. There is therefore no
violation of Article 86(1) unless a measure is maintained which violates another
Treaty rule. The article adds, on this reading, no new obligation.
However, it is possible to read the article more broadly, so that “contrary to”
means something like “against the spirit of ” or “undermining of ”. Then a state
might enact rules which undermined some Treaty article without actually
violating it as such, and Article 86(1) might catch this behaviour.
This reading is problematic, since it suggests some middle ground between
“permitted” and “forbidden”, some kind of good-faith obligation, which many
lawyers and legal traditions would resist furiously.5 Surely, if the Treaty does not
forbid a given measure, then states are free to do it? How can a measure be
contrary to the “spirit” of an article yet not contrary to that article itself ? Such a
rule is really an indirect and untransparent extension of the prohibition in
question. It is at best a very clumsy legal technique, at worst an undermining of
the legislative decision to extend the prohibition in question so far and no
further.
There is one situation where it may be defensible: where the state helps
private parties to violate provisions of the Treaty—competition law,
invariably—that are aimed at them. Because the prohibitions are not addressed
to the state, it does not violate Articles 81 and 82 itself. However, there is an
obvious argument that somehow the state should be prevented from helping
others to break laws addressed to them. Aiding and abetting the crime of
another is usually, and reasonably, a crime in itself.
This view is reflected in the existence of Article 10 EC, the duty of loyalty,
which creates a general obligation on states not to undermine the Treaty, in
addition to the specific obligations imposed by specific articles. The conjunction
of Article 10 and Articles 81 and 82 is a long-established way of addressing the
situation described above, where states act as accomplice or facilitator of private
Treaty violations.6
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4 J Temple Lang, “Privatisation of Social Welfare: European Union Competition Law Rules” in
Dougan and Spaventa (eds) Social Welfare and EU Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005), 46.
5 Cf O Lando, “Is Good Faith an Over-arching General Clause in the Principles of European
Contract Law?” (2007) 15 European Review of Private Law 841.
6 Eg Case 13/77 INNO v ATAB [1977] ECR 2115; Case 267/86 van Eycke [1988] ECR 4769; Case
311/85 Vlaamse Reisbureaus [1987] ECR 3801; Case C-2/91 Meng [1993] ECR I-5751; Case
C-185/91 Reiff [1993] ECR I-5801.
It is therefore not obvious that Article 86(1) does anything that Article 10 does
not already do, and that doubt is only fuelled by the fact that Article 86(1) has
traditionally been described as a specific expression of Article 10, as one instance
of the general rule.7 This would suggest that Article 86(1) cannot in principle
have a broader scope than Article 10. However, as a lex specialis Article 86(1)
might contain useful added specificity, enabling a broader application in practice.
Is this the case? The positions under Articles 10 and 86(1) are considered below
in the context of two controversial questions. One is whether state action that
restricts competition is caught by either or both of these articles in combination
with competition rules even without an associated competition infringement by
an undertaking. Is state responsibility necessarily linked to anti-competitive
private behaviour? If so—and the answer is found to be positive—how tight
must that link be? What degree of causation is sufficient?
1. Public Measures Restricting Competition under Articles 10 and
86
Where the state helps undertakings to make anti-competitive agreements, this is
assessed under the combination of Articles 10 and 81. Where the state
encourages abuse, this is assessed under Articles 86(1) and 82. This division of
labour results largely from the wording of Article 86(1), which, in referring to the
grant of “special and exclusive rights”, makes itself the natural home for issues
of dominance and abuse, while not speaking so naturally to issues of private
co-operation. Nevertheless, there is no principled division, and in particular the
European Court of Justice (the Court) has made clear that Article 10 could apply
to a public measure facilitating abuse, 8 while it is not unimaginable that the grant
of special and exclusive rights to a group of undertakings might have the effect
of supporting or encouraging in some way agreements contrary to Article 81.9
In any case, it matters little because the principles of state responsibility are
the same under either Article 10 or Article 86. Under Article 10 these stem back
to INNO v ATAB, where the Court stressed both the obligation of states not to
take action jeopardising the objectives of the Treaty and the status of Article
86(1) as a derivative of Article 10.10 However, it is the expression in the later Van
Eycke case that is more often relied upon:
“The Court has consistently held, however, that Articles 85 and 86 [now 81 and 82]
of the Treaty, in conjunction with Article 5 [now 10], require the Member States not
to introduce or maintain in force measures, even of a legislative nature, which may
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7 Case 18/88 GB-INNO [1991] ECR I-5941.
8 C-142/94 DIP v Commune di Bassano del Grappa [1995] ECR I-3257; GB-INNO, ibid.
9 See text to n 67 et seq.
10 INNO v ATAB, supra n 6. See P-J Slot “The Application of Articles 3(f), 5 and 85 to 94 EEC” (1987)
12 European Law Review 179–189.
render ineffective the competition rules applicable to undertakings . Such would be
the case, the Court has held, if a Member State were to require or favour the
adoption of agreements, decisions or concerted practices contrary to Article 85 [now
81] or to reinforce their effects, or to deprive its own legislation of its official
character by delegating to private traders responsibility for taking decisions affecting
the economic sphere.”11
This may be compared with the judicial formulas used where Article 86(1) is
combined with Article 82. Here the Court finds that Article 86(1) prohibits the
granting of rights “liable to create a situation where that undertaking is led to
commit such abuses”,12 which in some cases is refined to the suggestion that the
special right must almost necessarily lead to the abuse,13 while others suggest that
facilitating abuse or making it likely is sufficient.14
The starting point is therefore that the state will infringe the Treaty under one
of these combinations if it facilitates or encourages infringements of competition
law by undertakings, an apparently reasonable prohibition on public–private
conspiracy. Nevertheless, there is some suggestion that the situation may be more
complicated, namely that state actions which render private infringements
superfluous might also be caught. This superfluity arises when the state legislates
to put undertakings in a position which they could not have achieved themselves
without violating competition rules. For example, where the state legislates to
entrench fixed prices or standard specifications, the undertakings could only have
achieved this result alone by an agreement contrary to Article 81, and if the state
grants a monopoly, the lucky undertaking could probably only have achieved this
by using exclusionary tactics that would have been classified as abuse. Yet in
these cases the undertakings have not in fact made an agreement, nor behaved
abusively. The question is therefore whether the state measures should still be
caught by Articles 10 and 86(1).
As far as anti-competitive agreements go, this is generally considered to have
been answered in the Court’s “November revolution”, in Meng and Ohra.15 Here
the Court found that Article 10 could not apply in conjunction with Article 81
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11 Van Eycke, supra n 6.
12 Case C-475/99 Glöckner [2001] ECR I-8089.
13 Case C-340/99 TNT Traco [2001] ECR I-4109; Case C-323/93 La Crespelle [1994] ECR I-5077;
Case C-41/90 Höfner [1991] ECR I-1979.
14 Case C-179/90 Merci convenzionali porto di Genova; Case C-163/96 Raso [1988] ECR 533; Case
C-67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I-5751; Case C-115/97 Brentjens [1999] ECR I-6025; Case
C-203/96 Dusseldorp [1998] ECR I-4075; Case C-209/98 FFAD v Kobenhavns Kommune [2000]
ECR I-3743; Case C-147/97 Deutsche Post [2000] ECR I-825; Case C-38/97 Librandi [1988] ECR
I-5955; Case C-49/07 MOTOE [2008] judgment of 1 July 2008 (nyr).
15 Meng, supra n 6; Case C-245/91 Ohra [1993] ECR I-5851; Case C-185/91 Reiff [1993] ECR
I-5801; see W Sauter “‘State’ and ‘Market’ in the Competition and Free Movement Case Law of
the EU Courts”, TILEC discussion paper 2007–24, 82–87 (available on ssrn.com). The term
“November revolution” comes from N Reich, “The ‘November Revolution’ of the European
Court of Justice: Keck, Meng and Audi Revisited” (1994) 31 Common Market Law Review 459.
“in the absence of any link with conduct on the part of undertakings of the kind
referred to in Article [81](1) of the Treaty”.16 In subsequent cases the Court has
consistently investigated whether there was an actual agreement between
undertakings, of the sort prohibited by Article 81, before considering whether
the state may have supported this in a way violating Article 10. This does not
mean that state measures independent of private action are acceptable per
se—price control, for example, may infringe Article 28.17 However, Articles 10
and 81 will not be applied.
Where Article 82 is concerned the situation is more difficult. There has been
a lively academic discussion of whether Article 86(1) in combination with Article
82 prohibits the creation of a dominant position per se or whether there is a
necessary link with private abuse.18 Given that possession of a dominant position
is not in itself contrary to Article 82, prima facie one would think that creating
one should not automatically be a prohibited subversion of that Article.
However, debate has been fuelled by two cases which seem to suggest the
contrary, GB-INNO and Corbeau.19
In both of these cases an undertaking was entrusted with a monopoly over a
given public service, in the former case telecoms services and in the latter
postage. The core monopoly as such could be justified as necessary to guarantee
a universal service, and was not in issue. However, its precise scope was
challenged in both cases. In GB-INNO one of the privileges that the dominant
undertaking, the RTT, enjoyed was regulatory authority over telecoms
equipment. Anyone wishing to sell telephones on the Belgian market had to have
them approved by the RTT, as the network operator. Competitors claimed that
granting this power to RTT was in a violation of Article 86(1) since it amounted
to an unjustified extension of a dominant position—something that, if done by
the undertaking itself, would be in violation of Article 82. In Corbeau it was
claimed that the postal monopoly was extended beyond what was justifiable. It
included not only the market for regular postal services—where all parties
appeared to agree that a monopoly could be justified—but also services involving
collecting the post from the sender, a more specific and business-oriented market.
Corbeau argued that this extended scope of the monopoly was not justifiable by
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16 Meng, ibid, para 22.
17 Case 82/77 Openbaar Ministerie v van Tiggele [1978] ECR 25; Case 65/75 Criminal Proceedings against
Riccardo Tasca [1976] ECR 291.
18 See, eg L Hancher (1994) 31 Common Market Law Review 105, annotation of Corbeau; L Gyselen
(2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 425 annotation of Albany; D Edward and M Hoskins “Article
90: Deregulation and EC Law. Reflections arising from the XVI FIDE Conference” (1995) 32
Common Market Law Review 157; J Faull and A Nikpay (eds), The EC Law of Competition (Oxford
University Press, 2007), para 6.80; Temple Lang, supra n 4.
19 Case 18/88 GB-INNO [1991] ECR I-5941; Case C-320/91 Corbeau [1993] ECR I-2533. See on
this point eg A Gardner, “The Velvet Revolution: Article 90 and the Triumph of the Free Market
in Europe’s Regulated Sectors” (1995) 16 European Competition Law Review 78; Temple Lang, supra
n 4.
the need to ensure universal service. He then argued that if the undertaking
itself had used its dominant position in the regular postal market to exclude
parties from the more specific market, it would have been extending its
dominance in an abusive way, contrary to Article 82. Therefore, he said, it
followed that state measures achieving the same results—dominance in both
markets—were contrary to Article 86(1). Thus in both cases the argument was
made that state measures that achieved the same market-closing result as abuse
would have achieved were contrary to Article 86(1) even without that abuse
actually or potentially occurring. The state’s obligation was claimed to be
decoupled from that of the undertaking.
The Court appeared to confirm this in both cases, in GB-INNO saying that
under Article 86(1) states must not “put public undertakings and other
undertakings to which they grant special or exclusive rights in a position which
the said undertakings could not themselves attain by their own conduct without
infringing Article [82]”.20 It later went on to say that
“it is the extension of the monopoly in the establishment and operation of the
telephone network to the market in telephone equipment, without any objective
justification, which is prohibited as such by Article [82], or by Article [86](1) in
conjunction with Article [82], where that extension results from a measure adopted
by a State.”21
In Corbeau it said that “the Treaty none the less requires the Member States not to
adopt or maintain in force any measure which might deprive [the provisions of
Article 82] of their effectiveness”22 and went on to consider whether the
extension of the monopoly could be justified under Article 86(2). It seemed, in
other words, to assume that Article 86(1) applied to the state measure, despite not
suggesting anywhere in the judgment that the Regie des Postes was itself guilty of
any abuse.
Neither case is really unconventional. In both cases it is easy to conclude on
the facts that the state was encouraging abuse of dominance, so that the link
between public and private infringements is not broken at all. In GB-INNO this is
so because RTT was placed in a position where it could approve entry to the
telecoms equipment market by competitors, something which invites abusive
behaviour. This certainly counts as liable to create a situation where an
undertaking is led to commit abuse.23 This view is supported by comments the
Court made later in the judgment suggesting that this was its primary objection
to the situation:
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20 GB-INNO, ibid, para 20.
21 Para 24.
22 Corbeau, supra n 19, para 11.
23 See La Crespelle, supra n 13; Case C-69/91 Decoster [1993] ECR I-5335; MOTOE, supra n 14.
“To entrust an undertaking which markets terminal equipment with the task of
drawing up the specifications for such equipment, monitoring their application and
granting type-approval in respect thereof is tantamount to conferring upon it the
power to determine at will which terminal equipment may be connected to the public
network, and thereby placing that undertaking at an obvious advantage over its
competitors.”24
About Corbeau there are two arguments to be made. One is that the distinction
between “creating a dominant position per se” and “facilitating abuse” is an
unconvincing one, bearing in mind this latter phrase includes facilitation of
potential abuse, ie making it easier to commit abuse in the future.25 A dominant
position inevitably makes abuse easier, indeed actively encourages it.
Undertakings are self-interested. If one gives them market power, they are
likely to use it in ways that Article 82 would consider exploitative or
exclusionary. So it may well be correct that creating a dominant position is
often contrary to the combination of Articles 86 and 82,26 as is in fact expressed
to be the position under Articles 10 and 82.27 This will be the case if the special
rights create a risk of abuse, and any such abuse would be a sufficiently direct
consequence of the rights granted, that is to say sufficiently foreseeable or
inevitable.28 Just as undertakings holding a dominant position have a “special
responsibility” not to impair competition,29 it may be argued that states
creating dominant positions have a special responsibility to ensure that doing so
does not lead to abuse.
The second argument is that the grant of the dominant position was almost
certainly contrary to the rules on free movement and establishment.30 It is
orthodox that public measures closing service markets comprise restrictions on
these freedoms.31 Since such measures benefit an incumbent, they are also likely
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24 GB-INNO, supra n 19, para 25.
25 See text to n 48 below.
26 See Gardner, supra n 19, and infra, section B.2, for discussion of precisely when this is the case.
27 Case C-96/94 Spediporto [1995] ECR I-2883; C-142/94 DIP v Commune di Bassano del Grappa [1995]
ECR I-3257.
28 See MOTOE, supra n 14; La Crespelle, supra n 13, para 20; infra, section B.2.
29 Case 322/81 NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v Commission of the European Communities [1983]
ECR 3461.
30 See Edward and Hoskins, supra n 18, 173–75; Temple Lang, supra n 4.
31 See Case T-266/97 VTM [1999] ECR I-2329; Case 229/83 Au blé vert [1985] ECR 1; La Crespelle,
supra n 13; Merci Convenzionali, supra n 14; Case C-309/99 Wouters [2002] ECR I-1577; Case
C-94/04 Cipolla [2006] ECR I-11421; Case 30/87 Bodson [1988] ECR 2479; GB-INNO, supra n 19;
Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921; Case C-277/91 Ligur Carni [1993] ECR I-6621; see
also the Advocate General in Case C-446/05 Doulamis, judgment of 13 March 2008, but cf the
Court in the same case mysteriously ignoring his orthodox free movement argument, no doubt for
reasons of judicial economy (the question was not actually asked by the national court). On
justification, see Case C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I-4165; Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon [1979]
ECR 649.
to be indirectly discriminatory.32 In both cases they will be prohibited unless they
serve a legitimate goal and are proportionate—ie they do not exceed what is
necessary to achieve that goal. Assuming that the grant of the extended
dominant position in Corbeau exceeded what could be justified by the legitimate
public service goals—as the Court suggested might be the case and instructed
the national judge to consider—it was therefore contrary to the Treaty without
having to consider complicated constructions involving competition law.33
However, if an undertaking is granted an illegal exclusive right, as was
probably the case in Corbeau, is it odd to suggest that the exercise of this right
should be treated as abusive? 34 Undertakings may be treated as capable of
bearing some responsibility and of taking legal advice. If the state hands them a
prohibited weapon, they may still be punished for using it. On this view, if the
grant of rights infringed free movement law, then merely exercising those rights
would have been a violation of Article 82—a wrongful profiting from a wrongful
dominant position. But this, in turn, would mean that the liability of the state
under Article 86 would be quite conventional, since anti-competitive private
behaviour directly resulting from the public measure would now be involved.35
There is thus a chain of causation: the state is caught by free movement rules
and the undertaking which tries to profit from public behaviour contrary to these
is caught by Article 82, so the state is additionally responsible for facilitating
abusive behaviour. What this pathway really makes clear is how illogical the use
of Article 86 (or Article 10) in this context is. While free movement may once
have been more restrictively interpreted, it is addressed clearly to states, and is
perfectly capable of regulating and preventing unjustified anti-competitive
regulation in a far more rational, transparent and obvious manner than is the
case when state obligations are piggy-backed on those of undertakings.36
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32 Case C-203/96 Dusseldorp [1998] ECR I-4075; Case C-462/99 Connect Austria [2003] ECR I-5197.
See also Case C-405/98 Gourmet International [2001] ECR I-1795; Case C-387/93 Banchero [1995]
ECR I-4663; Case 155/73 Sacchi [1974] ECR 409.
33 See Temple Lang’s reference to the “artificial argument” in GB-INNO, supra, n 4, 59. Note that the
outcome via either Art 86 or free movement ultimately turns on the proportionality of the
measure—see the “limited competition” interpretation of Art 86 described by Edward and
Hoskins, supra n 18, 167.
34 Sauter, supra n 15, 104–106; Case C-198/01 CIF [2003] ECR I-8055; Case C-359/95 P Ladbroke
[1997] ECR I-6265; Temple Lang, supra, n 4, 55–59.
35 This makes it entirely irrelevant that the state put an undertaking in a position which it could not
have achieved on its own without abusive behaviour. The private abuse necessary to activate
public liability is not that which was rendered superfluous, which did not occur, but that which is
likely to occur, which is encouraged.
36 Free movement law only applies to measures having a cross-border aspect. However, these
include measures which potentially hinder market entry or which potentially disadvantage
non-national undertakings, as well as all those which discriminate. The threshold is thus not
higher than the competition requirement that a measure affect inter-state trade, and in some cases
lower.
The result of Corbeau is therefore not odd, only the lack of clear reasoning in
the judgment. However, it would be unconvincing to read too much into this.
There is a relative abundance of subsequent case law that reaffirms the necessity
of a link with a private infringement:
Article 86(1) applies “only if the undertaking in question, merely by exercising
the special or exclusive rights conferred upon it, is led to abuse its dominant
position or where such rights are liable to create a situation in which that
undertaking is led to commit such abuses”.37 If Corbeau is interesting, it is
therefore for two reasons: (i) because it implicitly extends the definition of abuse
to include the voluntary exercise of illegally granted rights; and (ii) because it
may be a judicial recognition that granting dominance will generally lead to
abuse. It does not, however, extend the reach of Community law supervision to
new areas, and nothing in the result could not have been achieved by a conven-
tional application of either Articles 10 and 82 or, more rationally, the
establishment and services rules.
2. The Public–Private Nexus
The most difficult unanswered question about the relationship between public
liability and private infringements is what degree of support or causation or
inducement there must be for the state to be caught. As well as being of obvious
general importance, this is relevant to the interpretation of Corbeau. If creating a
dominant position is sometimes per se contrary to Article 86, but not always,
then the distinction is likely to turn on the degree of linkage between the public
and private action.
At one extreme, it is quite clear that if the state “forces” undertakings to
engage in certain action, then neither Article 10 nor Article 86 will apply. In
such a situation the undertaking lacks the autonomy necessary for it to bear
responsibility for its own actions:
“Articles [81] and [82] apply only to anti-competitive conduct engaged in by
undertakings of their own initiative. If anticompetitive conduct is required of
undertakings by national legislation or if the latter creates a legal framework which in
itself eliminates any possibility of competitive activity on their part, Articles [81] and
[82] do not apply. In such a situation the restriction of competition is not applicable,
as those provisions implicitly require, to the autonomous conduct of undertakings.”38
It follows that there is no private infringement which could trigger a public one.
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ECR I-6025; Case C-340/99 TNT Traco [2001] ECR I-4109; La Crespelle, supra n 13; Raso, supra n
14; Case C-203/96 Dusseldorp [1998] ECR I-4075; Case C-209/98 FFAD v Kobenhavns Kommune
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[1988] ECR I-5955; Case C-69/91 Decoster [1993] ECR I-5335; Höfner supra n 13; Merci, supra n
14; MOTOE, supra n 14.
38 Case C-359/95 P Ladbroke [1997] ECR I-6265 paras 33–4.
Nevertheless, although the logic is compelling, some cases are less than clear
on this point. For example, in Bodson, local authorities in France granted
exclusive rights to funeral service providers, and as part of the contract these
undertook to charge what were in fact abusively high prices. The Court found
that
“In so far as the communes imposed a given level of prices on the concession holders,
in the sense that they refrained from granting concessions for the ‘external services’ to
undertakings if the latter did not agree to charge particularly high prices, the
communes are covered by the situation referred to in Article [86(1)] of the
Treaty . . .”
The implication is that the undertakings here had no choice, and the high prices
were in fact dictated by the authorities. Similarly, in Höfner, the Court found that
a public authority is in breach of Article 86(1) when it creates a situation where
an undertaking “cannot avoid” infringing Article 82.39 The suggestion is again
that simply acting as the law required was enough to comprise an abuse, and that
this situation was caught by Article 86(1).
In fact, in both Bodson and Höfner the Court found that the state facilitated
abuse, even put pressure on the undertakings to engage in it, but not to the
extent that they were deprived of autonomy. In both cases this was retained to
the extent that it was possible to speak of an infringement by the undertaking of
Article 82, and this infringement was a precondition for the finding of liability
for the state under Article 86. There was no “forced abuse”, no automatism and
no state control, as a careful reading of the cases shows.
In Höfner confusion may initially arise because the Court does say at one point
that the state has created a situation where the undertaking “cannot avoid”
infringing Article 82. The fact that this is self-contradictory should sound a
warning bell, and just two paragraphs later it rephrases matters as “a Member
State is in breach of [Articles 86(1) and 82] only if the undertaking in question,
merely by exercising the exclusive right granted to it, cannot avoid abusing its
dominant position”.40
The introduction of the words “merely by exercising” is crucial. That “mere
exercise” is a voluntary act, and is what makes it possible to speak of “abuse” at
all.41 The undertaking in Höfner had been granted an exclusive right by the state
to provide employment services of a certain kind, but it also had the power not
to enforce that exclusivity, as clearly emerges from the discussion of the facts in
the judgment. In certain areas, where it did not have sufficient expertise, it
tolerated the provision of services by other undertakings.42 It had the power to
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choose whether to exercise and enforce its exclusive right or not. The state may
have given it rights that positively invited it to engage in abuse, but the actual
abuse—the exercise of these rights—was nevertheless a decision by those
controlling the undertaking. The fact that the state encouraged, even pressured,
the undertaking is not treated by the Court as a defence to Article 82.
Similarly, in Bodson the Court explicitly addresses the issue of whether the
undertaking was forced into its actions. This was raised as a defence to the
Article 82 accusation, and met with the response
“That argument cannot be accepted. It is clear from the documents before the Court
that the grant of the concession for “external services” for funerals is regarded in
France as a contract concluded between the commune and the concession holder,
which, moreover corresponds to the view taken by the national court. It follows from
that finding that the level of prices is indeed attributable to the undertaking, since the
latter assumes full responsibility for the contracts which it has concluded.
Insofar as the communes imposed a given level of prices on the concession holders,
in the sense that they refrained from granting concessions for ‘external services’ if the
undertakings if the latter did not agree to charge particularly high prices, the
communes are covered by the situation referred to in Article [86(1)] of the Treaty.
. . . [public authorities] may not therefore assist undertakings holding concessions
to charge unfair prices by imposing such prices as a condition for concluding a
contract for a concession.
The word “imposed” is indeed used, but it is very clear from the text as a whole
that the Court considered the undertakings to have sufficient autonomy to bear
autonomous responsibility. They did not have to engage in a contract to do what
amounted to the abusive exploitation of consumers. It sums up its interpretation
of Article 86(1) as a prohibition on “assisting” undertakings in abuse.
The question remains “why the language of force?” Since the Court clearly
finds that in substance the undertakings had a choice, why does it muddy the
waters by using words implying state control? The reason, it is suggested, is to
make clear the basis of public responsibility: there must be a sufficient nexus
between the public measures and the abuse. As argued above, any exclusive
rights benefit the position of an undertaking and so, by making it stronger, may
facilitate anti-competitive behaviour in some sense. However, this is not
necessarily enough to implicate the state. Yet equally, too tight a link might also
break the chain, by reducing the autonomy of the undertaking below what is
necessary for the finding of “abuse” upon which state responsibility depends.
The descriptions of when Article 86(1) applies range from state-created
situations where an undertaking “cannot avoid” abuse to situations “creating a
risk of an abuse”.43 This latter is particularly helpful because it is offered as a
summary of the various other phrases used. In a recent case, La Crespelle, the
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Court says that “The question to be examined is therefore whether such a
practice constituting the alleged abuse is the direct consequence of the national
Law”.44 Article 10 cases, by contrast, typically refer to rendering competition
rules “ineffective” or “encouraging” anti-competitive agreements.45
It is clear that, as with reasonableness or proportionality, it is difficult to
describe a threshold for sufficient causation in a precise way. It is unlikely that the
different formulas are intended to express varying principles; rather, they are
different expressions of a common idea. This is probably most clearly captured
in the most-repeated phrase that the state must not act in a way “liable to create
a situation where that undertaking is led to commit such abuses” or, it is
submitted, is led to conclude anti-competitive agreements.46 Thus it is not
sufficient that the state action in some indirect way makes anti-competitive
behaviour easier—it must have the effect of “inducing” or steering or leading the
undertaking in the wrong direction so that the private act can be seen as a
“direct consequence” of the public one. On the other hand, there must be
sufficient commercial autonomy remaining that the undertaking can be held
liable for the transactions it enters into. There must be some voluntarism on the
part of the undertaking, even if this amounts to little more than agreeing to take
the state’s shilling. Thus, if the state authorises, or even fixes, excessive charges,
an undertaking will still abuse its dominance when it chooses to impose or collect
those charges on customers.47 However, if the state prohibits the transport of
certain kinds of goods at certain times, which in practice means that a dominant
undertaking is unable to supply competitors, then the undertaking will not
infringe competition law simply because it does not unilaterally ignore the
national law, with the consequence that Article 86(1) cannot be triggered.
Finally, it may be noted that state responsibility should not be dependent
upon the private infringement having actually occurred. Since Dassonville the
Court has quite reasonably been concerned to interpret economic law
pre-emptively and proactively.48 Both Article 81 and Article 82 also catch actions
which aim to restrict competition, even if there are no demonstrable effects.49
Logic and broader policy thus provide every reason to think that if a situation
August 2009 European Competition Journal 341
44 La Crespelle, supra n 13, para 20.
45 GB-INNO, supra n 19, para 31; van Eycke, supra n 6, para 16; Reiff, supra n 6, para 14; Case
C-153/93 Delta [1994] ECR 2157, para 14; Spediporto, supra n 27, para 20; Case C-35/99 Arduino
[2002] ECR I-1529, para 34; See Case 66/86 Ahmed Saeed [1989] ECR 803, para 49. See
E Szyszczak, The Regulation of the State in Competitive Markets (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007), 14–15
and 72–73.
46 See supra n 37.
47 Case C-340/99 TNT Traco [2001] ECR I-4109; Case 30/87 Bodson [1988] ECR 2479; C-242/95
GT-Link [1997] ECR I-4449.
48 Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837.
49 Eg Case 123/83 BNIC v Clair [1985] ECR 391; T-219/99; Case T-203/01 British Airways [2003]
ECR II-5917; P-J Loewenthal, “The Defence of Objective Justification in the Application of
Article 82 EC” (2005) 28 World Competition 455, 455.
inducing an infringement has been created, the state may be called to account
without waiting for the undertaking to actually do wrong.50 One may note here
the Court’s reiteration that Article 10 requires states not to introduce legislation
“which may [my italics] render ineffective the competition rules”, not just “which
renders ineffective”.51 One may also note Saeed; “[the] authorities must refrain
from taking any measure which might be construed as encouraging airlines to
conclude tariff agreements”.52 In light of this, it is suggested that the Meng
requirement that there be a “link with conduct on the part of undertakings” does
not have to mean that such conduct must have already occurred.53 In the Article
86 context the emphasis is similarly structural, on the creation of the situation
rather than the events to date:
“In those circumstances a legal framework such as that which results from the 1994
Law must be regarded as being in itself contrary to Article [86](1) in conjunction
with Article [82] of the Treaty. In that regard, it is therefore immaterial that the
national court did not identify any particular case of abuse by the reconstituted
former dock-work company.”54
Once again, a final connection with free movement must be made. It seems
that Article 86 adds nothing to Article 10, and that both of them are used to
address situations where the state regulates in a way helping undertakings to
exclude competitors, either on their own or as part of a cartel. Such measures
will invariably be restrictions on free movement.55 Article 86(1) is thus doubly
redundant. The important question is therefore not which Treaty Article
reigns, but whether a measure is justified and proportionate—the condition
for legality under free movement law, but also the issue addressed by Article
86(2).
C. WHAT DOES ARTICLE 86(2) DO?
Article 86(2) seems more useful than Article 86(1), providing as it does for a clear
restriction on the application of the Treaty to undertakings entrusted with
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economic services of general interest.56 The Treaty only applies to these
undertakings insofar as it does not “obstruct” the performance of their special
obligations. The Court has interpreted this to mean that the behaviour must be
“necessary” for the discharge of the public interest obligations in issue.57
This looks like an important guarantee that economic law does not prevent
general interest missions being carried out. Undertakings with an SGEI task are
granted a special derogation insofar as they may need it. This derogation is also
important for states; insofar as undertakings are exempted from competition law,
public measures supporting their behaviour run no risk of conflict with Article
86(1) or Article 10 in combination with the competition rules. Article 86(2)
determines the scope of the obligation in Article 86(1). It would be a more
obvious structure were the order of the two articles to be reversed: first
determine if the undertaking’s behaviour is anti-competitive and then, if so,
reiterate that the state may not support it.
The disappointment of Article 86(2) is, however, that it adds nothing to
derogations already existing elsewhere in the Treaty, notably within competition
and free movement law. Behaviour by dominant undertakings that serves the
general interest is not, the cases wisely suggest, abuse. Where agreements serve
general interest goals they do not violate Article 81 anyway. Restrictions of free
movement by public undertakings which are genuinely necessary for public
interest goals do not violate the free movement articles in the first place. There is
no attack on the general interest by economic law against which Article 86(2)
must defend. It tilts at windmills. The following sections expand on this.
1. Is Behaviour in the Public Interest “Abuse”?
The status of SGEIs within Articles 81 and 82 raises one of the fundamental
questions about the relationship between competition law and non-economic
interests. Can competition take account of anything other than a narrowly
understood range of economic arguments? Prima facie, one would expect that if
behaviour is genuinely necessary in order to provide a universal service to
inhabitants of a state, then Article 82 is severely defective if it labels this
behaviour “abuse”. Abuse is a pejorative term, clearly intending to catch
inappropriate or wrongful use of dominance. If that dominance is in fact being
used for a worthy and recognised goal, at the request of the state, in what sense is
it being abused?
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It is commonly argued that Article 82 should be interpreted in an “objective”
or “effects-based” or even “economic” way.58 One approach to this would define
abuse in terms of action that has a competition-reducing effect. This would leave
no room for “justifications” based on reasons external to those effects.59 A similar
result could be arrived at using a traditional, less economic, more normative
interpretation: competition is a good in itself, and Article 82 prohibits dominant
companies, without exception, from reducing it.60
However, this no-justification approach presents great practical problems. A
number of actions can have the effect of reducing competition and so changing
the market structure, but these may vary from particularly effective marketing
creating customer loyalty to predatory pricing and refusal to supply. Looking
only at effects on competitors would provide no basis for distinguishing between
legitimate successful business tactics and illegitimate ones, and would turn Article
82 into a ban on success.61 Any competition regulator is therefore forced to look
not just at effects, but at method—what is it that the dominant party is doing to
achieve this result? But many actions are ones that might be taken for entirely
legitimate reasons—cost reductions because of efficiencies, refusal to supply
because supply is genuinely limited—or with the intention to exclude. If
competition law is not to collapse into central planning, doing nothing more
than maintaining the status quo balance between companies, then it has to
distinguish between such situations, allowing competition to be reduced when it
is the result of good business tactics, but perhaps not in other circumstances.
What this amounts to in substance is asking whether the company in question
has an explanation for its behaviour other than the desire to exclude. It is
therefore unsurprising that the European Court of Justice increasingly uses the
idea of justification in the Article 82 context, looking to see whether behaviour
can be explained by, for example, legitimate commercial factors, and only finding
abuse where this is not the case.62
What is important here is that the Court has acknowledged that justifications
do not just need to be narrowly commercial—the public interest could in
principle suffice. In Hilti and Tetrapak the Court conceded that actions which
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would normally be abuse might not be if they were necessary for legitimate
public policy reasons—the issue in question was whether a refusal to supply
certain goods could be justified on grounds of health and safety. The companies
lost their argument on the facts because they simply could not show that this was
the real reason, or an adequate reason in the circumstances, for their action.
This was particularly so because they had undertaken their protective actions
without being asked to by the public authorities, and without asking the public
authorities. Quite rightly, the Court considered that one must be skeptical of
claims by commercial organisations to be acting in the public interest on their
own initiative. If private organisations can define the public interest, they
pre-empt what should be decided in the public domain in a democratic process.63
A successful public interest defence raised by an undertaking, on its own
initiative, will therefore be exceptional, and should only be possible for truly
uncontroversial interests—for example, where a clear public health danger is in
fact demonstrably at issue.
However, this highlights precisely the difference between these cases and the
SGEI situation. Where an undertaking has been entrusted with an SGEI and is
engaging in behaviour at the specific request of the state in order to ensure
universal access to a service of general interest, it is not the undertaking that is
unilaterally defining the public interest; rather, its defence is that the state has
defined the goal in question as being in the public interest. Proportionality
review remains, but the risk of a democratic deficit raised by the Hilti and
Tetrapak situations is removed.64
The judgments provide support for this. In both cases the Court implicitly
accepted that pursuit of the public interest might render behaviour non-abusive,
but found on the facts that the undertakings could not show that this was their
true goal.65 The major reason was that they had not obtained, or sought, any
state approval or support for the actions that they claimed the public interest
demanded. The Court found that undertakings could not, on their own
initiative, autonomously determine the public interest, pursue it and expect this
to excuse them from Article 82.66 Once this objection is taken away, by an SGEI
entrustment, it seems most plausible that actions which the state approves as
necessary to provide an important social service, and which do not fail the
proportionality test, simply do not violate Article 82. Article 86(2) is once again
irrelevant.
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2. Article 86(2) and Agreements Restricting Competition
The arguments made above can also be applied to apparently collusive
behaviour that is in fact necessary for SGEI provision, and the Court
unsurprisingly takes a somewhat similar approach, accepting in principle that
actions in the public interest are not within the Treaty definition of a restriction
on competition.67
Such useful collusion is not unusual. In SGEI contexts the state often wants
undertakings to be involved in decision-making about service provision and the
structure of the market. Agreements on quality of service or technical standards,
or even on customer allocation or market division, may be supported and
encouraged, in the interests of stability and quality.
Prima facie, where undertakings sit down and agree such things they are
violating the Article 81 prohibition on agreements whose object or effect is to
restrict competition. The effect of such agreements is certainly to restrict the
ways in which undertakings may compete, and often who may compete and on
what terms. However, in a line of cases going back more than ten years the
European Court of Justice has been quite consistent that such agreements do not
violate Article 81 if their restrictive effect on competition is no more than
ancillary to a genuine public interest goal.68
There are two paths to this result. One is summarised in Wouters, where the
Court said that if:
“a Member State, when it grants regulatory powers to a professional association, is
careful to define the public-interest criteria and the essential principles with which its
rules must comply and also retains its power to adopt decisions in the last resort . . .
[then in that case] the rules adopted by the professional association remain State
measures and are not covered by the Treaty rules applicable to undertakings.”69
Thus, where the state delegates decision-making to a group of undertakings, with
sufficient control mechanisms to ensure that agreements serve the public interest
and  not  just  the  self-interest  of those  undertakings,  notably  a  state-reserved
power to derogate from the agreements if necessary, their conclusions are not
agreements at all in the Article 81 sense. This was not, on the facts, actually the
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case in Wouters, but in other cases it has been, and the principle is no longer
controversial.70
The other path, however, is contested. This is where the Court finds that
undertakings have concluded an agreement that limits competition but does not
violate Article 81(1) because it serves a legitimate public interest. The “nature
and purpose” of the agreement,71 or its “objectives” and “context”,72 mean that
it should be seen not as a restriction on competition but as a general interest
measure.
Thus, in Albany the Court found that agreements between undertakings
concerning pensions were not prohibited by Article 81 because they were
necessary for a legitimate social purpose, even though they inevitably had a
certain competition-reducing effect.73 However, the leading case is now Wouters.
Here bar council rules which restricted competition and amounted to an
agreement between undertakings were nevertheless not prohibited by Article 81
because they were necessary for the proper regulation of the legal profession,
and the restriction of competition that was entailed was no more than was
inherent in the regulatory role.74 Subsequently, in Meca-Medina the Court found
that sporting rules agreed between commercial sport organisations, even though
they restricted competition, were outside Article 81:
“even if the anti-doping rules at issue are to be regarded as a decision of an
association of undertakings limiting the appellants” freedom of action, they do not,
for all that, necessarily constitute a restriction of competition incompatible with the
common market, within the meaning of Article 81 EC, since they are justified by a
legitimate objective.”75
The clear line running through these cases is that agreements between
undertakings which restrict competition are nevertheless not within the Article
81 prohibition if they go no further than is necessary to serve a legitimate
objective, be that proper regulation of the professions, the proper conduct of
sport or social policy. The Court has not spelled out in so many words which
objectives it would consider legitimate in this context, but it is hardly contro-
versial to suggest that it is public interest objectives that it has in mind, rather
than objectives serving the interests of the undertakings in question.
Nevertheless, a number of arguments have been made for a narrower
reading. For example, it has been suggested that Wouters should be understood
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more narrowly, as only applying to “deontological ancilliarity”—the ethical
regulation of professional activities, within the context of general regulatory
principles laid down by the state, also referred to as “regulatory ancilliarity”.76
There is, however, no support for this narrow reading in the case. While Wouters
does indeed concern regulation of a profession, the Court in this case, and also
in Meca-Medina, emphasised the legitimate objective of the agreements in
general, rather than suggesting that professional regulation was different from
other legitimate public interest goals. Indeed, any such distinction would be
arbitrary from an economic, policy or competition perspective. Loozen argues
that the important point is that in situations of deontological ancilliarity the
parties are under sufficiently tight legislative constraints that their action can be
considered as legitimately delegated regulation, which is not the case where they
are given more freedom to implement more general goals.77 However, if the
argument of an undertaking is that its action is in fact necessary to achieve a
legitimate state-defined goal, then the question of whether this is so, and they are
in fact carrying out a public mission, is evidential rather than principled. As she
suggests, the fundamental Article 81 issue is whether the limitation on
competition is welfare enhancing, and while the degree of legislative contraint
may be evidentially relevant to that, there is no logical reason why it should be
conclusive.78
It has also been suggested that a distinction should be made between
agreements which actually increase competition in some way (eg vertical
restraints), which may compensate for the decrease which they cause in other
ways, and agreements which have other, more public interest-like benefits.79 The
first might escape Article 81(1) as being ultimately pro-competitive, while the
second would have to find some non-competition justification. It has been
argued that Wouters can be understood, at least partly, in the light of this
distinction, since the measures involved could be seen as having some
pro-competitive effects, the proper functioning of the bar being necessary for
effective competition.80 This was also the suggestion of the Advocate General in
the case.
However, the distinction is economically arbitrary.81 As the Court of First
Instance (CFI) has said, the economically relevant distinction is between rules
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increasing consumer welfare and those decreasing it,82 but in a situation of
market failure this distinction does not correspond to a simple distinction
between “more” or “less” competition.83 The idea of separating “pro-
competitive” effects from “public interest” effects is essentially a formal one,
resting as it does on the mechanism by which welfare may be increased, rather
than the substantive issue of whether it actually is. Since the distinction lacks any
policy basis, it is perhaps not surprising that in Wouters the Court did not use it,
and found the agreement in question to fall outside Article 81 not because it in
fact increased competition in some way, but, as O’Loughlin puts it, “on a public
interest type justification relating to professional secrecy and avoidance of
conflicts of interest, and unrelated to the operations and functioning of the bar
from a competition perspective”.84 Even if there were “pro-competitive” effects
at issue, and relevant to the final decision, there were also classic public interest
ones, and the Court considered them all without categorisation before
concluding that the “proper practice” of the legal professions justified the rule
and therefore saved it from Article 81. This is the language of the global public
interest, not of a narrow assessment of net competitive effects.85
The position is perhaps most clearly summarised by the CFI. It has been very
sceptical of the integration of public interest arguments into Article 81(1),
refusing to accept that a rule of reason has been introduced.86 However, now
that Article 81(3) is directly effective, the difference between 81(1) and 81(3)
becomes of rather academic interest.87 The substantive issue is which
agreements are caught by the Article 81 prohibition as a whole. Here the CFI
has provided a remarkably pithy analysis, in support of which it cited Wouters:
“However, not every agreement which restricts the freedom of action of the
participating undertakings, or of one of them, necessarily falls within the prohibition
in Article 81 . . . as the objective of the Community competition rules is to prevent
undertakings, by restricting competition between themselves or with third parties,
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from reducing the welfare of the final consumer of the products in question
(paragraph 118 above), it is still necessary to demonstrate that the limitation in
question restricts competition, to the detriment of the final consumer.”88
The condition that restrictions act to the detriment of the consumer before
conflicting with the Treaty is economically entirely sound, and entails a
balancing of factors before determining whether an agreement is prohibited.89
That balancing may sometimes be complex, since it includes all factors relevant
to the welfare of the consumer, and the consumer, as Wouters implicitly
acknowledges, is not always only interested in price.90
Therefore, despite continuing ambiguities, the outcomes in Wouters and
Meca-Medina, combined with the public interest type language in those cases,
mean that the most plausible reading of this case law as a whole is that Article
86(2) is irrelevant to agreements between undertakings in the context of SGEIs.
Where they take place within the context of a state-approved public interest
function and are necessary for public interest objectives, they will fall within the
Wouters exemption anyway.91 If they are not necessary, then they are self-serving
and Article 86(2) will not protect them.
There are certainly evidential issues raised.92 A rather vague public mission
may easily be abused by a group of undertakings to create a cartel under the
cover of public service,93 and unless the undertakings can show that the state
approves and requires their activities, and that law or regulation constrains them
sufficiently to act within the limits of the public service goal and not just in their
own commercial interests, they will have a hard task relying on the Court’s
exemption. In both Albany and Wouters it was demonstrable that the undertakings
were to a significant extent required by law and their own statutes to act in the
public interest. However, in Meca-Medina this was not so clearly the case, and the
Court did not make this point decisive in any of the cases. The principle
embodied by the cases is therefore more general: agreements restricting
competition which are genuinely and demonstrably necessary to achieve a public
interest goal do not violate Article 81.
3. Article 86(2) and State Aid
As regards state aid, it is clear since Altmark that a fair price paid for defined
services does not constitute aid.94 Thus, if the state wishes to pay an undertaking
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to provide a universal service, or to provide a service to those who cannot pay for
it themselves, then as long as it states clearly what exactly is to be provided and
what exactly is to be paid, and the rates are not above normal market ones, state
aid rules are not a problem. Thus Article 86(2) would only be useful if a state
wished to move money towards an undertaking in some ambiguous and
undefined way or if it wished to pay more than was actually necessary to provide
the services—if it wished to turn on the cash tap to provide open-ended support
for the undertaking, as has so often been the tradition in Europe. Yet this
behaviour would not survive Article 86(2) either.95 The Court has interpreted this
article, quite reasonably, to mean that state behaviour which would normally
violate the Treaty, but is necessary to maintain the public service task, is
permitted.96 There is therefore a necessity requirement. The degree of judicial
scrutiny of necessity is variable and not always intense,97 but funding on an
open-ended or undefined basis, in excess of fair or market rates for the service in
question, would inevitably exceed what is necessary. There are good reasons for
states to purchase services on behalf of the population as a whole or segments of
it, and the state aid rules do not inhibit this. There are not, generally, good
reasons for states to provide solvency guarantees to undertakings,98 and even
Article 86(2) would not save these. None of this excludes the possibility that, were
a major SGEI undertaking to teeter on the edge of failure, with potential
consequences for the availability of the service, the state might be permitted to
step in and take emergency measures. However, this is because the rules on state
aid envisage such a situation and provide for it.99 Article 86(2) remains an
irrelevance.
4. Article 86(2) and Free Movement
Article 86(2) concerns the application of the law to undertakings. The classical
use of free movement rules is against states. However, in circumstances where
undertakings—public or even private—do in fact have the power to generally
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restrict free movement, the rules apply to them.100 This has most commonly
occurred where undertakings play a quasi-regulatory role within a particular
economic sector, notably sport. It could also occur where an undertaking enjoys
supervisory or regulatory powers connected with its special SGEI role, for
example as in GB-INNO or La Crespelle. The undertaking could then be argued to
be restricting free movement, and Article 86(2) might therefore seem to have a
useful role in enabling them to escape its broad prohibitions.
However, by contrast with competition, free movement has a developed and
explicit notion of justification and exception. Free movement is not absolute, and
behaviour restricting it is only prohibited insofar as it is not justified by legitimate
goals and proportionate to those goals.101 The category of justifications which
may be accepted is an open one, bounded by the notion of the “general good”
or the “public interest”.102 The goal of guaranteeing universal and adequate
access to services of general interest can obviously fall within this, and a measure
genuinely necessary to enable that is extremely unlikely to be disproportionate.
The overlap between Article 86(2) and the existing derogations from free
movement is complete. An undertaking that is honestly trying to achieve social
goals within the framework of a state-imposed SGEI mission, rather than
profiting from protectionism, has little to fear from free movement law in the first
place.
D. DOES ARTICLE 86 ENTAIL A LESS INTENSE REVIEW?
If general interest derogations exist within competition and free movement law,
the question arises whether these are as generous as Article 86. An argument that
is often cited is that review of acts by undertakings or, more commonly, state
measures under Article 86 is more forgiving than it would be if derogations
internal to economic law were being applied.103 In particular, measures wishing
to rely on these derogations must be not only in the service of a legitimate goal,
but also proportionate. By contrast, in order to rely on the Article 86 exemption,
the measure must, according to the Court, simply be necessary for the discharge
of the SGEI obligation. It is certainly possible to interpret “necessary” as an
abridged version of proportionality, something lesser and less intrusive, without a
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balancing of interests or the search for an alternative less restrictive means of
achieving the same end.104 Indeed, in a number of cases the Court has
emphasised that states do not have to show that there is no other way of
achieving their goals.105 It is sufficient that within the structure and SGEI
entrustment that they have chosen the given measure is a necessary element.
This seems to afford a greater discretion to Member States to design their
systems of SGEI delivery, in the security that no cogs in the final machine will be
displaced by the law, so long as those cogs really are important to the machine.
In reality, the difference in standard is illusory. Asking whether a measure is
necessary entails considering alternatives. What does necessity mean if not that
no alternative would do? The Article 86 formula collapses into the standard
proportionality question, “is this the least restrictive measure that could be
used?” Any difference between Article 86 proportionality review and propor-
tionality review in free movement or competition is not the result of which
phrase is used but of how intensely it is applied; it is of course possible to
scrutinise state claims to different degrees, from a presumption that their claims
of necessity are correct, to a full judicial investigation of the facts. The claim that
Article 86 is more forgiving than other contexts is really a claim that Article 86
review occupies a more generous position on this scale than proportionality
review in other contexts does. However, this is wrong.106 While it is true that the
Court has accepted state claims in Article 86 cases, this is nothing to do with the
Article as such, but to do with the factual context. Suggesting that Article 86 has
its own standard of review seems to rest on a misconception that free movement
or competition analysis inherently entails rigid and penetrating judicial
assessments, whereas Article 86 does not.
On the contrary, proportionality is inherently context dependent.107 Courts
applying it take into account a number of factors from political sensitivity to the
complexity of the subject matter of the case.108 Public law commonsense entails
that they must scrutinise seriously whether justifications put forward are genuine
and legitimate,109 and, even if they are, that they must hold states to a
meaningful standard of proportionality but should not second-guess political
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choices, or engage in substantive policy redevelopment. This is the path judges
have to tread whatever the Treaty article they are applying. The huge variation
in the way proportionality is applied in free movement displays this.110 There is
not a “free movement standard” but a general principle, which is used for more
or less intense review according to the facts.
There is thus no reason to think that the Court would decide SGEI cases any
differently if the proportionality or necessity review was done under the heading
of free movement or competition rather than Article 86. The complexity of
SGEIs and the many factors involved in determining what is adequate provision
make it inevitable that courts will be forced into a relatively shallow review in
most cases, not because of the law, but because of the limits of the judicial
function and capacity.111 The Corbeau deference is not a feature of Article 86, but
of the nature of the context.
Additionally, within the context of Article 86 the Court has acknowledged
that undertakings delivering SGEIs can only operate in financially viable circum-
stances.112 A measure that is necessary to make the economics of the SGEI
obligation acceptable attracts Article 86 exemption. This can be contrasted with
the orthodox position under free movement law, that derogations from free
movement cannot be relied upon for purely economic reasons.113
This difference also amounts to less than it may seem. While it is indeed a
doctrine of faith that free movement cannot be restricted for economic reasons,
it is the conditions that the Court attaches to this rule which are perhaps more
important than the rule itself. That is to say, if the economic consequences of
restricting state action are so severe that they affect other interests—the stability
of the system, public health—then they may be taken into account.114 Saving
pennies is not in itself enough to restrict fundamental freedoms, but if saving
those pennies is in fact necessary to keep a social protection system stable, then it
is acceptable. This is really not so different from what occurs under Article 86.
Here the Court says that measures may be taken to ensure that SGEI obligations
are performed under economically acceptable conditions. But what are econom-
ically acceptable conditions for an undertaking? Clearly, conditions which permit
354 Article 86 EC ECJ VOL. 5 NO. 2
110 See Jans, ibid; G Davies, “Abstractness and Concreteness in the Preliminary Reference
Procedure” in N Nic Shuibhne (ed), Regulating the Internal Market (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar,
2006).
111 See Edward and Hoskins, supra n 18, 170–171. On how and whether courts are capable of
assessing these kinds of cases, see Hammer, supra n 3; D Bailey, “Scope of Judicial Review under
Article 81 EC” (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 1327; M Bay and J Ruiz Calzado, “Tetra
Laval II. The coming of age of judicial review of merger decisions” (2005) 28 World Competition
433.
112 See, eg Corbeau, supra n 19; Brentjen, supra n 14; Albany, supra, n 57; TNT Traco, supra n 13.
113 Eg Case 72/83 Campus Oil [1984] ECR 2727; Case C-157/97 Geraets-Smits [2001] ECR I-5473;
J Snell, “Economic Aims as Justification for Restrictions on Free Movement” in A Schrauwen
(ed), The Rule of Reason (Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2005).
114 Geraets-Smits, ibid; Case C-372/04 Watts [2006] ECR I-4325.
a profit. And what happens if such conditions do not exist? The very existence
of the undertaking and the stability of the system are inherently threatened.
Thus, while the Court sometimes states that it is not necessary to show that an
undertaking would fail financially, but simply that economic conditions would be
unacceptable, this is really a false opposition.115 In business there are ultimately
only two positions: profit and failure.
The opposition can be best understood as reflecting the facts that conditions
may change and that undertakings may be involved in more than one activity.
Thus, providing an SGEI under loss-making conditions for a year, or some
years, may not lead to failure, since the undertaking may have income from
other sources and historical buffers and there may be profit in the future
expected. Yet it is hard to see why such arguments could not fit within free
movement too. When the Court permitted states to restrict patient freedom to
receive hospital treatment abroad on the grounds that the costs involved could
threaten the stability of national health systems, it was not endorsing the
concrete claim that one year of free movement of patients would in fact lead to
the collapse of public health systems and a partial cessation of domestic
healthcare;116 rather, it was accepting the broader claim that, in general, over a
period of time, paying for hospital care abroad could make the provision of
adequate hospital care at home financially unsustainable. Such unfettered free
movement would create economically unsustainable conditions for domestic
healthcare provision.117 This is no different from the “economically acceptable”
conditions of Article 86. As with proportionality, there is an issue of real
substance here—how much economic downside can a state or a provider be
realistically expected to bear—and the answer varies according to the factual
context. That there has been a fairly provider-friendly approach in the context
of Article 86 is more plausibly explained by the nature of the decisions to be
made, and the fact that the providers involved are (potentially bankruptable)
undertakings, rather than the nature of the Treaty article. There is no reason,
on the basis of the case law so far, to think that if the same issues were
considered without Article 86 the European Court of Justice would have come
to different conclusions.
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E. COMPETITION, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
If competition law is founded on economics, then it is founded primarily on the
idea that perfects markets maximise allocative efficiency.118 The essence of this
idea is that in a perfect market goods and services go to the buyer prepared to
pay the most for them. However, what makes this mathematical insight relevant
to policy is the acceptance of an additional assumption: that how much people
are prepared to pay for something is an indicator of how much benefit they
derive from it. This assumption rests on the premise that people know best what
is in their own interests and will increase their well-being. Then it can be claimed
that a perfect market ensures goods and services go to those whose well-being is
increased the most by them.
This is clearly a prima facie desirable policy outcome. In fact, it is acceptance
of the assumptions and theory in the paragraph above which makes the
economics of competition relevant for policy, and which justifies basing
competition law on economics. Otherwise it would be an entirely arbitrary thing
to do, and, given the complexity and contestedness of much economics, a very
inefficient way of resolving disputes.119
Economics describes the situation of allocative efficiency as a Pareto-efficient
state, which is defined as a state in which no individual can become better off
without making someone else worse off. This amounts to the same as the
description above for the following reasons: suppose an individual pays a certain
amount for a good, but someone else is prepared to pay more. Pete paid 5 euros
because he thinks it is worth 5 euros. John thinks it is worth 7 euros. In a perfect
market they will then transact voluntarily, with Pete selling the good to John for a
price between 5 and 7 euros. This benefits both, since Pete will be paid more
than it is worth to him and John will get the thing for what he thinks is a good
price. The state prior to their transaction was thus Pareto inefficient—it was still
possible to make someone better off without making anyone else worse off.
However, if all goods and services have gone to those prepared to pay the most
then no such transactions will be possible, and an individual can only become
better off (acquire goods or money of greater value to him than what he already
has) if another individual is forced to engage in an involuntary transaction (so
they become worse off). This idea that perfect markets lead to Pareto efficiency is
called the First Welfare Theorem,120 because, given the assumptions above, it
means that perfect markets maximise total welfare, where welfare is measured in
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terms of the benefit that someone acquires from possessing a good, service or
money.
The kinds of measures that welfare economics says competition law should
restrain are those that decrease Pareto efficiency, that is to say, move the situation
further away from a Pareto-efficient state. These measures decrease welfare as
measured above.121 What exactly such measures are in the real world is highly
contested. One should not make the mistake of thinking that welfare economics
or competition economics have reached any kind of consensus or stable state of
knowledge that can be taken as reliable and authoritative gospel for the rest of
us.122
The problem is that there are no perfect markets. What are sometimes called
market failures means that there are no actual circumstances to which the First
Welfare Theorem can be unconditionally applied.123 Many things, including
externalities (side effects not factored into the price of a good, such as the fact
that my factory pollutes your garden but you are unable to make me pay),
information shortages, laws which limit and restrain economic activity, confound
the theory.124
Nor is willingness to pay for something a perfect proxy for the increase in
well-being that it will bring. People have bad information, get confused about
their long-term interests and do silly things.125 Rich people may also value a euro
much less than poor people do, so that their willingness to pay 10 euros
corresponds to a much smaller increase in subjective well-being than would be
indicated by the same willingness on the part of a poor person. “If he’ll pay 10
euros, he really wants it.” “She may do that on a whim, it’s nothing to her.” This
undermines the basis for using welfare economics as a foundation for policy.
Nevertheless, there may be some markets which approximate to perfection
sufficiently for economics to be worth applying, particularly since it has
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developed tools to deal with some of the problems mentioned above, to some
extent.126 At any rate, this is the presumption which justifies, from an economic
point of view, the existence of competition law, and in particular of Articles 81
and 82. The economic justification for these articles is that they prevent
undertakings from acting in a way that decreases total welfare, by making the
market less perfect. Actually, in practice, competition authorities in both the EU
and US concentrate on one aspect of welfare, consumer welfare, and try to
interpret competition law in a way maximising this.127 However, a core principle
underlying an economics-based competition law is that it is not competition as
such that is being protected, but welfare. Competition may be a good in itself for
competition lawyers, but for society its value lies in its welfare effects.
However, when markets no longer approximate sufficiently to a perfect
market, maximising competition may no longer maximise welfare.128 The
economic basis for prohibiting certain kinds of restrictive measures therefore
disappears. The presumption that these measures are inevitably welfare reducing
no longer holds. On the other hand, government intervention in markets, which
in a perfect market would be welfare reducing, may in fact be welfare increasing
in an imperfect market. In an imperfect market the presumption against state
restrictions no longer holds either.129 It is important to remember here that, while
economics tends to measure welfare in a distinctive way—by willingness to
pay—the concept of welfare involved is one based on the subjective well-being
of individuals, just as in the ordinary use of the word.130 Competition economics
aims to maximise the well-being of those participating in the market—which in
the case of SGEIs is almost everyone.131
Given the reality of imperfect markets, competition law is faced with a choice:
(i) it can have formal clear rules, which may approximate to economic rationality
in some situations but will depart from it in others. For example, it may prohibit
all price-fixing or extension of a dominant position, and three times out of four
this will make economic sense, but in odd or complex markets it will not, and the
prohibition may actually decrease welfare and be Pareto inefficient. Tant pis—law
is not perfect; or (ii) it can decide to follow economics, and take a case-by-case
approach, based on economic analysis, to each situation. Then it will ask in each
case, “is this measure Pareto inefficient/welfare reducing?” If so, it will be
prohibited; if not, it will be permitted. This is the approach that is in fashion in
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the EU, and which the Commission and most lawyers claim is gaining ground in
EU competition law.132
SGEI markets are some of the most dysfunctional markets that exist.133
Almost everything is stacked against their good functioning. Products are
complex, so that people will lack information or the ability to process it. Good
choices require a long-term perspective and a good understanding of risk, which
research suggests most of us do not have.134 Externalities are ubiquitous; my
welfare is very much affected by the education, healthcare and general public
services that my neighbours receive—it changes the kind of society that I live in
and the quality of my life. There are certain kinds of products that people would
like to buy but that markets are unable to deliver; security and certainty are
important parts of many public services, the guarantee that terms will be
continued for the long term, but only the state can provide such guarantees.
Suppose I want to buy more than healthcare, I also want to buy a guarantee that
I will be looked after for the rest of my life as long as I obey the law? No market
can offer that product. Finally, factors such as differences in income mean that
willingness-to-pay is a poor way to measure welfare gains.
SGEI markets are therefore so riddled with distortions that state intervention
may often be a welfare-increasing Pareto-improvement. The challenge is to
identify when this is the case, so that welfare-improving public measures can be
permitted by the competition rules while welfare-reducing ones continue to be
blocked. A number of analytic tools and frameworks can be useful here.
One is the distinction between public measures which aim to compensate for
market failures, and therefore aim to be welfare increasing, and public measures
which do not in fact aim to be Pareto-improvements at all.135 The first category
would include many measures addressing the fact that, for example, people lack
information, cannot understand it or tend to be short-term thinkers, or the fact
that the market is unable to provide certain kinds of products. Rules compen-
sating for these failures, if successful, are Pareto-improvements. In the second
category one would find primarily redistributive and justice-based measures.
Ideas of justice and fairness may, for example, dictate that certain goods should
be accessible to all on equal terms not because this in fact increases total welfare
or compensates for market failures, but for other kinds of moral and social
reasons.
A strong tradition of competition theory, stemming from Bork, says that
competition should take no account of distribution.136 It should maximise total
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welfare, and then other policies should deal with redistribution. In fact this
hard-core view is probably no longer held by a majority of economists any more,
but it does have a certain attractive clarity.137 It could, moreover, be understood
to mean that redistributive measures which limit competition should be treated
as anti-competitive, because they are not concerned with correcting market
failures and increasing total welfare, but with moving that welfare around. It
might therefore offer a framework for distinguishing SGEI measures that
competition law can permit from those that must find a justification external to
competition—such as Article 86.
However, in practice the distinction is less useful than it may appear. States
rarely argue that they are reducing total welfare, in a Pareto-inefficient way, in
the name of justice and fairness. Rather, they deny the opposition of welfare and
justice.138 They usually make the claim that justice and fairness are in fact
Pareto-efficient, because a lack of justice or fairness represents a significant
externality. Thus even redistributive measures are in fact corrections for market
failure. For example, a government wishing to increase equality is likely to justify
its measures by saying in the long term this increases everybody’s welfare, rather
than openly stating that it is prepared to make society as a whole less well-off to
help the few.
As a result, almost all public interventions in SGEI markets will be claimed to
be welfare improving.139 The question of whether competition law should permit
them is then primarily evidential.140 Here it has been claimed that the
appropriate approach is to treat government claims to be remedying market
failure with great scepticism.141 One of the premises of market economics is that
individuals know their interests best, and no state can be well enough informed
to allocate resources as efficiently as markets can.142 Hence it is often argued by
economists that, while state intervention in imperfect markets may be welfare
increasing in principle, there should be a very high burden of proof on the state.
Allowing the government to just assert that it knows best could be a slippery
slope.
In a “normal” market there is much to be said for this approach. However, it
is the nature of SGEI markets that the kind of externalities and failures involved
are very difficult to assess. How much is well-being reduced by inequality or the
unhappiness of others? How much do people understand their future public
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service needs? How much would they pay for security and certainty? There are
no ready-made economic theories that can provide quick answers to whether
public intervention on grounds of such complex and subtle market failures is
welfare reducing or not. One could commission major research, of course, but
these are not questions to which final answers can be expected. They involve the
kind of controversial judgements that are the stuff of politics. Nor can the
market, even in principle, address all these issues, since to some extent they
involve the costs in public happiness of market freedom itself.
Yet they are real externalities, of importance to welfare, and to simply ignore
them because they are difficult would undermine the legitimacy and rationality
of policy. Thus a more rational approach is perhaps to concede a certain status
to the judgements of elected and accountable public authorities about whether
their actions increase welfare. They must provide, perhaps, coherent arguments,
but their judgement of the factual questions on individual values and preferences
deserves a certain deference. Thus, whether a market restriction infringes
competition rules should be treated as an economic question about
Pareto-efficiency and welfare, but the legislator should be accorded deference on
factual issues which science cannot yet answer clearly. Competition cannot avoid
a “total welfare increase” general interest defence if it is to be economically
rational,143 and no authority is as well placed to judge the relevant welfare issues
in a dysfunctional market as the state.
F. CONCLUSION
1. The Senselessly Divisive Effect of Article 86
The harm, apart from confusion, which Article 86 causes is that competition and
economics get an undeservedly bad name; EU competition policy seems as if it is
heartless and socially harmful. This undermines the legitimacy of the EU, and
the opposition between market and society is once again artificially resurrected,
with all the problems that this creates for rational politics and policy. Article 86 is
not just intellectually weak, it tries to reopen old political wounds and redivide
societies.
Article 86 also makes a symbolic division between SGEIs and other services.
Somewhat similarly to the above, this division both rests upon and supports the
idea that measures concerning SGEIs are unique and require special treatment,
in contrast with other national measures, concerning, for example, other services.
This is wrong. Many national rules can be socially important and the balancing
involved in SGEIs is not unique at all, even if it may perhaps be more explicit
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and important than in many contexts. Indeed, it is one of the achievements of
the European social market model that the old-fashioned oppositions of public
and private, social and market, and state and business have been set aside in
favour of a co-operative integration of the two in the service of both.144
Attempting to undo this work by designating some services and the regulation
concerning them as “of general interest”, and thus implicitly designating the
remainder as “purely economic”, is positing a division that is not just harmful,
but, in the modern European state, is factually false. The concept of SGEIs as a
fundamentally separate group requiring a fundamentally specific analysis does a
great injustice to the complexity of the interaction between social and economic
interests. Just as economic activity provides the basis for many social benefits, the
regulation of economic activity, in general, is of great social importance, and the
choice of technique and scope of regulation is important for the same kind of
social reasons as the regulation of SGEIs is important: they serve the goal of
creating a socially just, aesthetically pleasing and financially viable society.
2. Undertakings as State Agents
Competition law is in a sense struggling with issues which the Treaty and the EU
have already resolved. The tension between market freedom and regulation is
not be resolved in favour of one side or the other, but is an ongoing balance.
Markets contribute to social contentment, but so do market restrictions in the
form of law. Hence while the EC Treaty reflects a positive view of competition
and markets, it does not impose any general requirement that states only regulate
in demonstrably quantifiably efficient ways. The assessment of which laws
improve the general good continues to be, often, too subtle and complex for
economists to measure, and remains within the political domain.
When undertakings act as agents of the state, there is no particular reason to
treat their actions differently from state actions.145 SGEI measures taken by an
undertaking, but which fall within the remit of a public mission entrusted to that
undertaking, should not really attract the attention of Article 82 at all. The
undertaking is here acting on behalf of public authority, and should be held to
the same standards as public authority—those of free movement law and of
Article 10. The only reason to diverge from this would be if there were some
principled reason to discourage states from co-operating with undertakings in
this way.
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It is hard to see what that reason would be, and it would be regressive were it
to exist. The interactive partnership between states and private undertakings in
the general good is a very European development, and one at the heart of the
continental European social-market model. It is a rejection of the hard division
between public and private, or state and market or economic and non-economic
interests which has caused so much conflict both on the global scale and within
nations. It has been adopted by the EU, and among policymakers—as within
society—seems firmly entrenched. There is little call for state control of
economic life, but not for deregulation of sensitive public services. Cooperation
between public regulators and private providers is Europe’s preferred path, and
such co-operation inevitably entails a degree of decentralisation of decision-
making. The test, then, should not be whether the resulting measures are abuse,
since they are not adopted in the commercial pursuit of market success, not qua
undertaking, but the test that is normally applied to market-restricting
regulation—whether it is proportionate.
3. A Directive on Services of General Economic Interest
In recent years there have been many calls for a directive on services of general
economic interest, as a way of providing legal certainty in this troubled and
important area.146 However, horizontal regulation is not the answer. The
conclusions above are that SGEIs are just like other areas where individual
freedom and other policies collide: there is a need for a balancing process, and
judges must engage with this to the best of their capacity. Further elaboration is
simply adding confusion. Where these simple general principles are not
enough, the answer is in sector-specific rules that can engage with the technical
oddities of the particular context. However, it is hard to see how a horizontal
elaboration of the general principle that it is acceptable to limit competition
and free movement where necessary for important social goals would take that
principle any further. The law is really quite easy. The difficult work is in
judging the facts.
The call for such a directive arises out of the confusing state of the case law
and the desire for certainty. Here is a suggestion: certainty can be more simply
and reliably achieved if states authentically take the interests of free movement
and competition into account when designing their SGEI systems.147 Then, if
challenged, they will be likely to win their cases. Instead, there is a tendency to
seek procedures and rules which exempt them from this requirement, to look for
a safe garden where they can think about their SGEI preferences and safely
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ignore the competitive and trade-restrictive effects. That garden will never be
found as long as a state is within the EU. The desire for it is probably an organi-
sational side effect—those responsible for policy in one area do not want to be
burdened by the need to consider others. Nevertheless, for a state which is a
member of the EU, it is a disreputable search.
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